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Introduction
Merger analysis often involves a comparison between the pre-and postmerger degrees of concentration in a market. This degree of concentration matters since a high concentration measure is supposed to proxy for lack of competitiveness in that market. The standard index that is used to measure the level of concentration in an industry is the Her ndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI possesses the so-called convexity property in that it increases whenever there is a`mean preserving spread' of rms' market shares in an industry. Consequently, it yields a higher concentration level in response to any merger between rms.
Suppose that there are three rms with percentage market shares of 70, 25 and 5 in Industry 1. Ceteris paribus, the HHI would deem that this industry is more concentrated and thus less competitive than another one, Industry 2, which has market shares of 70, 15 and 15. This can be far from obvious, since in Industry 2, a dominant rm facing two relatively small and potentially insigni cant rivals may simply`follow' the lead of the dominant rm whereas, in contrast, in Industry 1, the dominant rm facing a competitor with a 25% market share may be able to provide greater competitive restraint to the dominant rm than two equally-sized but smaller rivals of Industry 2 can.
Similarly, using the HHI a merger of two 15% market-share rms when there is a single rival would raise the HHI and may be deemed anti-competitive. This too can be far from obvious, since a 30% rival may prove to be far more vigorous and competitive against the dominant rm than two 15% rms. 1 1 With such a merger, the HHI would rise from 5; 350 pre-merger (using the standard convention of normalizing the HHI to be out of 10; 000) to 5; 800 post-merger. Consequently, as can be seen from 'safe harbour' examples below, this merger would certainly fall outside any safe harbours established in merger guidelines issued by competition regula-Given this issue with the HHI (and the other concentration indices that will be brie y discussed in the next section), in most jurisdictions a merger that would lead to signi cant cost savings and so raise welfare would have a path to legal clearance (for example 'authorisation' in Australia, the 'ruleof-reason' in the United States). Hence, in reality an increase in the HHI would not stop a merger but rather would force the merging parties to prove their cost savings, although it may be possible that a merger of small rms can raise competition directly, even if there are no cost savings.
Noting these issues with the HHI (and other indices below), we propose and analyse an alternative index which emphasizes the concept of 'competitive balance'. 2 This new index is designed to have the convexity property of the HHI when a merger involves one of the m largest rms, but to decrease and thus to indicate an increase in competition when a merger is purely among the (n m) smallest rms. 3 tors in Australia, the European Union and the United States, for instance. (Safe harbours de ne tolerable post-merger market concentration and/or concentration-change thresholds, above which proposed mergers are deemed likely to be anti-competitive. They are typically set via the HHI and changes in the HHI, i.e., HHI.) Australia: HHI < 2000; or HHI > 2000 and HHI < 100: The European Union: HHI < 1000; or HHI is between 1000 2000 and HHI < 250; or HHI > 2000 and HHI < 150.
The United States current: HHI < 1000; or HHI is between 1000 1800 and HHI < 100; or HHI > 1800 and HHI < 50:
The United States proposed: HHI < 1500; or HHI < 100. See Yang and Pickford (2011).
A Brief Review of Concentration Indices
Let the market shares of n rms be listed as v 1 v 2 ::: v n > 0 where P v i = 1. As mentioned above, the standard, most-prominent industry concentration index is the (HHI): HHI(v 1 ; :::; v n ) = (a 1 v 1 +:::+a n v n ), where a i = v i so that the weights, a 1 ; :::; a n ; sum to one.
Another notable concentration index, the four-rm concentration ratio (C4), does not depend on the market shares of rms which are not the largest four rms:
. Neither does it assign di erent weights to di erent market shares of the rms.
There are a few other notable concentration indices. One, proposed by Hall and Tideman (1967) , stresses the need to include the number of the rms in the calculation when measuring the concentration level of an industry (the number of rms measures the ease of entry into that particular industry).
The Hall-Tideman concentration index (HT I) is Hart (1967, p. 78) . Unlike the other indices considered thus far, it does not have a range of 0 to 1. Rather, it takes the value 0 when the market structure is a monopoly and takes a value far exceeding 1 when the market structure is perfect competition.
Finally, Dansby and Willig (1979) introduced alternative performance indices that measure the potential social gains from appropriate government interventions (such as anti-trust, regulatory, and deregulatory actions). Their performance indices establish a welfare theoretic basis for indices such as C4, HHI, and others. Essentially, Dansby-Willig versions of these indices incorporate a weight that is the inverse of the price elasticity of the industry demand. Alternatively, Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark (1982) (who use a Cobb-Douglas functional form) provided an index that assigns weights to not only rms' market shares but also to total output. Note that any merger would increase the measure of industry concentration according to all of the indices above, except for C4 in which any merger beyond the largest four rms would not have a neither negative nor positive e ect on the measure of concentration unless the newly merged rm itself becomes one of the largest four rms.
CB* -The Competitive Balance Index
The`competitive balance' index we propose has di erent implications than the indices discussed above when horizontal mergers do not include the largest rm(s). Denote this index when there are m dominant rms in an industry as CB (m), where 1 m n. When m = 1, Firm i's market share relative to that of the sole dominant rm is v i v 1 . It follows that the total market shares, relative to the largest rm's market share is v 1 v 1 + v 2 v 1 + ::: + vn v 1 . We rst consider this index when market shares of rms are measured in terms of only the largest rm's market share, CB (1).
Observe that CB (1) = (v 1 ) 2 HHI . Table 1 provides a few examples to illustrate the stark di erences between the HHI and CB (1). Although there may be industries in which increasing the market share of the second largest rm could cause a reduction in the industry price, in many industries a reduction in price could not be achieved until a higher critical number of large rms is reached. For example, Lamm (1981, p. 75) reports empirical ndings from the food retailing industry that in many urban markets \growth in the 3 largest rms' shares have a signi cant positive e ects on prices... In contrast, an increase in the market share of the fourth largest rm causes a reduction in food prices." This clearly indicates that the number of dominant rms in a market may be greater than one which is critically important to the analysis of a potential merger. Thus, we now explore our index with m > 1 dominant rms, CB (m).
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Observe that when m > 1; CB (m) = 
For the second case where Firm i and Firm j merge such that i; j m; slightly modify the above argument.
The next proposition describes how much CB (m) increases when Firm
Proposition 2 
The implication of the preceding proposition is that according to CB (m), a merger between a small rm and a relatively large dominant rm will increase the concentration level in that industry more than will a merger between the same small rm and a relatively small dominant rm. Thus, Propositions 1 and 2 verify that CB (m) satis es the convexity property of the HHI when a merger involves one of the m largest rms, but decreases and thus indicates an increase in competition when a merger is purely among the (n m) smallest rms. 
Discussion: An Example
The general idea behind our index is that a merger between two small rms that creates a more competitive mix of rms should be allowed, even if that mix yields a net reduction in the number of rms by one and an increase in the HHI. The main purpose of this discussion section is to provide an example of mergers that would increase the level of concentration according to the HHI, although these mergers are capable of increasing competitive balance and economic welfare. Not surprisingly, they decrease the level of concentration according to CB. Heubeck et al. (2006) discuss the inadequacy of the HHI and other concentration indices that simply add pre-merger market shares of merging rms to approximate post-merger shares. The basic problem is that this method ignores second-order \industry wide strategic e ects" that arise from post-merger competition where rms strategically alter quantity or pricing decisions.
The following example begins with the standard dominant/fringe rm model. We next allow a subset of the fringe rms to merge at a level that makes them competitive against the previously unique dominant rm. Premerger status quo is such that the dominant rm sets its price based on residual demand, leaving the fringe rms to take that price and choose output accordingly. In post-merger setup, however, the newly merged rm is on equal footing with the previously dominant rm and engages in Bertrand competition where the remaining fringe rms take the price that results from that competition as given.
The pro t motive for the merging rms is akin to Caveat 3 (page 1245) of Levin (1990) : they merge in order to eliminate redundancies in xed costs. We adopt this motive for two reasons. First, the elimination of xedcost redundancies is su cient to guarantee the pro tability of the merger.
Second, we wish to avoid variable production e ciencies as their presence would possibly lead to merger approval even if the HHI suggests otherwise (recall the discussion in the Introduction).
Our speci c example is as follows. 4 Demand in the market is Q = 90 P , where Q is the total quantity produced by all rms and P is the market price. The dominant rm has a cost of C = 50 + 1 2 q 2 d where q d is quantity it produces, and each of the four smaller fringe rms has a cost of C = 45 + q 2 f where q f is quantity each such rm produces. Inverse Residual Demand for the dominant rm's product is therefore P = 30 1 3 q d . Then in this market the dominant rm sets a price of $24 and produces 18 units, generating a pro t of $220. Suppose the fringe rms follow the dominant rm by accepting that price; then each produces 12 units and earn pro ts of $99. Now let two of the fringe rms merge in an e ort to eliminate xed cost redundancies and become strategically more competitive against the dominant rm. Assume that the remaining two fringe rms remain on the fringe, taking the equilibrium price arising between the previously dominant rm and the newly merged rms as given. That price equilibrium is arrived at via Bertrand competition for the residual demand left by the two remaining fringe rms. 5
The marginal cost curves of the rms that merged yield the cost function of this newly-created dominant rm, C = 50 + 1 2 q 2 d 0 , where the reduction in xed costs has put the merged rm on equal footing with the previously unique dominant rm. Given that there are only two remaining fringe competitors, the Inverse Residual Demand curve facing the two Bertrand competitors is now P = 45 1 2 q d 0 . The Bertrand equilibrium price in the game between the dominant rms can easily veri ed to be $22:50. At that price the previously-dominant rm as well as the newly-merged dominant rm each produces 22:5 units and each earns $203:13 in pro ts. Each of the two remaining fringe rms now produces 12:25 units and each earns $92:81 in pro ts. For all prices above $22:50, each rm nds it pro table to lower its price if the other rm matches or goes below that price. 6 Once the price reaches $22:50, no rm nds it pro table to lower the price further as doing so will only give them the opportunity to sell additional units at a price below the marginal cost of providing them.
The reduction in xed costs that accompanies the merger leads to joint pro ts for the merged rm that are greater than the summed individual pro ts they would have earned by remaining on the fringe. Because the market price is lower than the pre-merger price and marginal costs have not changed, the merger leads to an increase in welfare. Pre-merger, the market shares were ( 1 3 ; 1 6 ; 1 6 ; 1 6 ; 1 6 ). Post-merger, they become ( 1 3 ; 1 3 ; 1 6 ; 1 6 ), leading to pre-and post-merger HHI measures of 0:22222 and 0:27777 respectively.
Alternatively, the pre-and post-merger CB (1) measures are 0:5 and 0:4. 6 Once again, the argument deviates slightly from the standard Bertrand argument that the rms nd this pro table because they pick up the entire market. For instance, hypothesize that both rms charge $22:51. The result then is that they split residual demand, each supplying 44:49 units and making $203:12 in pro ts. By lowering their price to $22:50, either rm can now sell 22:5 units at a pro t, and slightly increase pro ts. It is worth noting that the rm does not pick up the entire residual demand of 45 units at the price of $22:50 because supplying any units beyond 22:5 units incurs a marginal cost of Q that is greater than the price.
Thus, this example illustrates how a merger that is welfare enhancing can decrease CB , but increase the HHI.
Extending the example further, we can use CB (2) by then allowing the two remaining fringe rms to merge in order to compete with the two dominant rms, putting all three rms on equal footing. It can be easily con rmed that once the nal two fringe rms merge, the equilibrium Bertrand outcome is for each rm to charge $22:50, resulting in output by each rm of 22:5 units. There is no welfare loss since the pre-and post-merger prices are the same. Using the pre-and post{ merger market shares of ( 1 3 ; 1 3 ; 1 6 ; 1 6 ) and ( 1 3 ; 1 3 ; 1 3 ) yield the respective pre-and post-HHI measures of 0:27777 and 0:33333. Likewise, the pre-and post-merger CB (2) measures are 0:8 and 0:66666, once again illustrating how a merger that is welfare enhancing can decrease CB , but increase the HHI.
Finally, in our index the analyst must make a judgement about how many rms to include in m, but once m is chosen, a merger involving two small rms decreases the index, and a merger involving at least one of the large rms raises the index. One relevant question then is "what determines m?" In some cases, the industry analysts may have already determined it empirically, as reported in Lamm (1981) that was mentioned above (as observed in the food retailing industry, \growth in the 3 largest rms' shares have a signi cant positive e ects on prices... In contrast, an increase in the market share of the fourth largest rm causes a reduction in food prices"). In some other cases, like in the example we have just provided above, a natural gap between the market shares of rms may provide strong clues about m: E.g., if the market shares pro le is ( 1 3 ; 1 6 ; 1 6 ; 1 6 ; 1 6 ), then it would be straightforward to deduce that
